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WHEN PRINCIPLED REPRESENTATION 

TESTS ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 

TERRI R. DAY* 

SCUIT L. ROGERS** 

In this life we prepare for things, for moments and events and situ­
ations . . .. We worry about things, think about injustices . ... 
Then, all of a sudden, the issue is not whether we agree with what 
we have heard and read and studied. . . . The issue is us, and what 
we have become. 1 
INTRODucnON 
At one point in time, every lawyer or would-be lawyer ponders 
the decision to become a lawyer. Some give it more consideration 
than others; some base their decisions on practical considerations 
while others contemplate lofty goals. For some, the decision is 
based on a realistic view of the legal profession and the roles law­
yers play while, for others, the decision is premised on an unrealis­
tic depiction of lawyers, Hollywood-style. 
Whatever the configuration of conjured images of lawyers and 
the legal profession, each would-be lawyer must necessarily settle 
on a vision of where she belongs within these images and a set of 
aspirations to be obtained through entering the profession. 
Have these aspirations been met? Is one disappointed by the 
reality of practicing law? Periodically, along the way from novice to 
experienced lawyer, one should ask the questions: as a lawyer, am I 
honoring the legal profession-"professionalism looking outward"; 
and as an individual, is my legal practice consistent with my own 
sense of right and wrong-"professionalism looking inward." 
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Often the answers to these questions are found in the decisions law­
yers make about the clients and causes they represent. 
Imagine an attorney who has built a reputation representing 
victims of race discrimination. Early in her career, when the law 
overwhelmingly favored her opponents, she persevered with a deep 
passion and certainty in the correctness of her cause. In her heart, 
she knew that the law and public sentiment were at odds with fun­
damental fairness and decency. Over time, her legal arguments and 
those of her like-minded colleagues began to erode the status quo. 
The legal and social environment-in part due to her efforts-be­
gan to change so that once unpopular notions and positions fell into 
favor and gained broad acceptance. This is why she became a law­
yer: to help dismantle the unjust discrimination she observed and 
regarded as antithetical to a humane and decent society. 
She sleeps well at night knowing that she has made a differ­
ence. She looks forward to each day with the knowledge that she 
will continue to make a difference. One day her 9:00 a.m. appoint­
ment arrives. A white woman explains that she was rejected from 
graduate school because the university she applied to had instituted 
an affirmative action program which she felt to be unconstitutional. 
Despite the attorney's pro-affirmative action stance, she sought the 
attorney's counsel because of her broad experience and under­
standing of the nuances of discrimination law. 
The attorney politely informs the client that she cannot take 
the case. To her, affirmative action policies are a lawful response to 
historic invidious discrimination. She explains that she has devoted 
her practice to advancing racial equality, a legal principle in which 
she believes strongly, one which forms the bedrock of her individ­
ual sense of justice. She cannot in good conscience take the client's 
case for she cannot zealously represent her without silencing that 
inner voice that tells her the difference between what is right and 
what is wrong. The prospective client listens and asks whether the 
attorney could "in good conscience" take on the case of any Cauca­
sian person with a similar claim of discrimination. The attorney re­
plies that she cannot. Is the attorney engaging in race-based 
discrimination or is she declining the case for reasons of 
conscience? 
The decision in Stropnicky v. Nathanson 2 disregards entirely 
the professional and personal considerations that drive the attor­
ney's decision whether or not to accept a case, and focuses exclu­
2. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25, 1997). 
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sively on societal concerns with eliminating discrimination. In so 
doing, it overlooks a long-lived deference accorded attorneys in the 
decision of whether to accept or decline a client's case and the legit­
imate rationale underlying such deference. 
In Stropnicky, the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis­
crimination ("Commission") held that attorneys' client selection 
decisions are to be regulated by the Massachusetts public accom­
modation law.3 Ms. Nathanson, an attorney specializing in divorce 
law, refused to take Mr. Stropnicky's case because she had pre­
mised her practice on advancing the cause of women in the family 
law area in an effort to remedy past and present gender bias in the 
courts. Mr. Stropnicky had sought representation from Ms. Na­
thanson based on her reputation in the family law area.4 
Mr. Stropnicky was the stay-at-home partner in the marriage, 
and, as the economically disadvantaged partner, sought out Ms. Na­
thanson who was well known for representing women who had such 
traditional roles.5 Claiming that Ms. Nathanson had discriminated 
against him on the basis of his gender, Mr. Stropnicky brought the 
instant action before the Commission which fined Ms. Nathanson 
$5,000 for engaging in unlawful gender discrimination in violation 
of the Massachusetts public accommodation law.6 
In deciding Stropnicky, a case of first impression in Massachu­
setts, the Commission entered a growing debate on whether lawyers 
and law firms are subject to public accommodation laws. Nowhere 
is there evidence that the Massachusetts Legislature intended the 
law to be applied to a lawyer's client selection decision. The Com­
mission's decision, however, reaches to the deeper issue of whether 
lawyers are to retain traditional unfettered discretion in making cli­
ent selection decisions or whether they are to be constrained in 
3. According to Massachusetts public accommodation law "any distinction, dis­
crimination or restriction on account of ... sex .•.. relative to the admission of any 
person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation" is unlawful. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1997). 
4. See Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39. 
5. See id. at 40. 
6. See id. Place of public accommodation is "any place, whether licensed or unli­
censed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public ...." 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (1997). The Commission found that the definition was 
broad enough to include a law office. Other jurisdictions addressing whether profes­
sionals fall within the definition of a "public accommodation" have found otherwise. 
See Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in New York: The 
Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 335-43 
(1993). 
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making such determinations by the competing policy concern. of 
eliminating discrimination. 
This paper will address how the Stropnicky decision intrudes 
into the important discretion historically accorded lawyers in decid­
ing whether to represent a client. By seeking to require an attorney 
to undertake a matter that he would otherwise refuse as a matter of 
conscience, the decision pits the rules that regulate lawyers against 
themselves. Not every lawyer will be able to meet the requirements 
of zealous advocacy under conditions of personal, political or ideo­
logical aversion. Whereas the rules permit an attorney to decide for 
herself whether a client's best interests will be advanced when these 
interests clash, application of the Massachusetts public accommoda­
tion law, without regard to these ethical and professional considera­
tions, threatens both an attorney's professional autonomy in 
matters of conscience as well as serve to undermine a client's well 
being, and ultimately the legal profession. Part I is a concise review 
of the professional responsibility rules that pertain to the attorney's 
duties and prerogatives in the selection of a client. These rules, 
which regulate and offer guidance to facilitate the avoidance of con­
flicts of interest and other ethical dilemmas, have always recognized 
the importance of placing the client selection decision squarely 
within the attorney's discretion. Part II proposes an analytical 
framework for assessing the internal and external factors which un­
derlie such discretion as articulated by the professional responsibil­
ity rules. Part III focuses on the ways in which laudable 
antidiscrimination principles may collide with the professionalism 
concerns that accord a lawyer discretion in deciding whether or not 
to represent a prospective client. Part IV applies the analytical 
framework set forth in Part II to the facts of Stropnicky. The con­
clusion suggests how antidiscrimination principles can coexist with 
ethical and professional considerations that support discretionary 
client selection decision-making without compromising either 
principle. 
I. 	 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CLIENT SELECTION 
DECISION 
The legal profession did little to regulate its membership prior 
to the turn of the 19th century. By 1909, however, many state bar 
associations had embraced, in one form or another, the Canons of 
Professional Ethics ("Canons").? Among the 32 Canons originally 
7. In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted a set of rules for lawyers called 
27 1998] PRINCIPLED REPRESENTATION 
adopted by the American Bar Association, Canon 31, which dealt 
with the matter of discretion in the client selection process, pro­
vided that "[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as [an] advisor or 
advocate [by] every person who may wish to become his client. He 
has the right to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own 
responsibility must decide what [employment] he will accept as 
counsel ...."8 The American Bar Association's subsequent adop­
tion of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model 
Code") and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model 
Rules") has not fundamentally altered the substance of these rules 
as currently found in each state's code of ethics or professional 
responsibility.9 
Sensitive to its monopoly on the practice of law, the legal pro­
fession has long recognized the need of its membership to act so as 
to secure representation for all persons. lO Accordingly, the Model 
Code and the Model Rules set forth regulations and aspirational 
goals in an effort to ensure the ethical and honorable practice of 
law, eliminate practices that serve to discredit the profession, and 
provide guidelines for attorneys to follow to minimize the likeli­
hood of improper or conflicted representation. Today, the Model 
Code and the Model Rules adhere to the general principle that, 
absent conflict, an attorney is encouraged to take on a client's 
cause. With this precept in mind, however, the rules qualify this 
requirement by sanctioning an attorney's decision to refuse a cli­
ent's case for good cause. l1 These rules of professional conduct 
the Canons of Professional Ethics. Most states adopted the Canons through legislation, 
court rules, or as rules of the state bar. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL 
ETIUCS 55-56 (1986). 
8. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIUCS Canon 31 (1908). 
9. Approximately 40 jurisdictions have adopted some form of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct while the remaining jurisdictions continue to apply a form of the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See STEVEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETIUCS 3-5 (3d ed. 1992). 
10. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 87 (1978). 
Hazard criticizes this antiquated rationale, reasoning that "liberal admission to the legal 
profession has much weakened the monopoly." Id. 
11. Lawyer's are obligated to accept appointments from the bench: 
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid an appointment by a tribunal to represent a 
person except for good cause, such as ... (c) the client or the cause is so 
repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship 
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONOuer ("MODEL RULES") Rule 6.2 (1994). "A 
lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer 
regards as repugnant." Id. cmt. 1. Similarly, "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as 
[an] advisor or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in 
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serve the dual purpose of maintaining the highest standards of pro­
fessionalism12 so that clients may be assured the best representation 
possible, while at the same time recognizing a lawyer's need for au­
tonomy when deciding whether to undertake a cause for which the 
lawyer may feel a profound commitment or aversion. 
II. Two FACES OF PROFESSIONALISM 
A. Professionalism Looking Outward 
Lawyers wield great power and influence in the American soci­
ety. Lawyers serve as the guardians of our law-dependent demo­
cratic society. They have been and will continue to be key players 
. in shaping how individuals and institutions deal with the great is­
sues of our time. As guardians, lawyers are gatekeepers of the sub­
stance, process and procedures of law enabling parties to articulate, 
prosecute and defend individual claims. It is through legal repre­
sentation that clients are assured open, equal and fair access to 
courts and our system of justice. 
The various rules of professional responsibility which require 
zealous advocacy, loyalty, confidentiality, and championship of the 
oppressed, poor and unpopular, serve to ensure equal access to the 
courts, reinforce the high ideals of law in society and highlight the 
important public service performed by lawyers. Such rules define 
the standards of conduct demanded of lawyers as well as provide 
the basis upon which sanctions may be meted out when a lawyer 
fails to meet these standards. The 1908 Canons of Professional Eth­
ics provided that the lawyer had an obligation to give "entire devo­
tion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and 
defense of his rights and the exertion[s] of [the lawyer's] utmost 
learning and ability."13 Today, Canon 7 of the Model Code pro­
vides that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the 
bounds of the law."14 From the perspective of professionalism 
looking outward, the legal community recognizes that lawyers, by 
furtherance of this objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer 
should not lightly decline proffered employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ("MODEL CODE") EC 2-26 (1996). 
12. There is debate as to whether the professional rules articulate the highest 
standards of professionalism or a minimal standard to which a lawyer must adhere. 
Without responding to the debate, it is assumed that, in theory, one of the purposes of 
the rules is to inspire lawyer conduct which meets the highest standards of 
professionalism. 
13. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). 
14. MODEL CODE Canon 7. 
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fulfilling their roles as legal technicians and undertaking a client's 
cause indifferent to their own personal beliefs, serve the greater 
good of securing the availability of legal services to all, along with 
unqualified advocacy.ls As is discussed below, the rules are di­
rected at ensuring that an attorney fully appreciates the extraordi­
nary commitment she is making to devote the full extent of her 
legal skills, intelligence and abilities to the representation of the cli­
ent before she agrees to take on a matter. As the rules anticipate, 
such an undertaking is not always possible. 
B. Professionalism Looking Inward 
An attorney's decision to accept or decline the responsibility 
associated with undertaking a client's case cannot be evaluated 
solely on the basis of what is best for the client or what is best for 
the profession. Without question, such a decision also calls for an 
inquiry into what is reasonable to expect from an attorney.16 It is 
no surprise that lawyers can feel passionate about the causes they 
champion, that they may even base their professional raison d'etre 
on the passionate representation of such cases. Accordingly, the 
very same standards of professionalism that call for an attorney to 
take on a cause may, at times, require a degree of fidelity to a cli­
ent's cause that a lawyer finds impossible to muster. This paradox 
emerges when a lawyer is asked to represent a client whose cause 
she regards as repugnant. The Model Code's response that "[a] 
lawyer is under no obligation to act as advisor or advocate for every 
15. The metaphor of attorney as "cab driver" applied to English Barristers: "He 
takes whomever beckons to whatever destination may be commanded." HAZARD, 
supra note 10, at 89. Under the "cab driver" model, even the most repugnant legal 
claims were entitled to be argued and provided an intellectual challenge for the oral 
advocate. In contrast, professional rules have protected American lawyers from forced 
representation of clients or causes the lawyer regards as repugnant. Ironically, the cab 
driver metaphor may be applicable to American lawyers today out of business 
necessity. 
16. "Judge George Sharswood's 'Essays on Professional Ethics,' delivered to the 
graduating class of the law department of the University of Pennsylvania in 1854," 
formed the basis of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. E. Wayne Thode, The 
Ethical Standards for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REv. 575, 580 (1961). In his address, 
Judge Sharswood asked: "'But what are the limits of his duty when the legal demands 
or interests of his client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right? This is a 
problem by no means of easy solution.'" Id. at 581. Judge Sharswood offers that 
"[c]ounsel have an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned 
for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends [sic] his [sic] sense of what 
is just and right ...." Id. (quoting George Sharswood, Professional Ethics, 32 A.B.A. 
REP. 81, 96 (1907». 
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person who may wish to become [a] client,"17 along with the Model 
Rules' comment that "[a] lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept 
a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repug­
nant,"18 serve the interests of both the client and the compromised 
attorney. The client is benefitted by an attorney's refusal to repre­
sent him in a matter when the attorney is incapable of fully repre­
senting the best interests of the client by providing zealous 
representation. Relatedly, the attorney is spared the intellectual 
and emotional hardship of undertaking an action for which there is 
an ideological dislike, or worse, disdain, resulting in a personal/pro­
fessional integrity conflict. 
Much of the time, a client's cause and the legal argument that 
supports it lack partisan interests to an attorney. Contract disputes 
typically involve persons and circumstances that do not rouse an 
attorney's intense ideological or political interests. Sometimes, 
however, an attorney is asked to take on a case which requires ad­
vocacy of a legal position and a construction and presentation of 
facts in a manner that is inconsistent, perhaps even in direct con­
flict, with strongly held· beliefs. Such representation may place the 
attorney in the position of fighting for a vision of the law and of 
society she condemns. For this reason, perhaps more than any 
other, the rules encourage an attorney to decline representation 
under such circumstances. In this regard, Professor Geoffrey Haz­
ard comments that the notion of a lawyer as a mere agent of the 
client 
assumes th~t the law is a settled and acknowledged body of rules. 
It assumes that the lawyer as advocate in court simply helps the 
judge 'understand' the rules and 'discover' their application to 
specific situations. It assumes that the lawyer as counsellor takes 
the rules as fixed channels into which transactions must be fitted .. 
It ignores altogether the role of the lawyer as lobbyist. Most im­
portant, it ignores the fact that legal rules are now recognized as 
being more or less uncertainly positioned guidelines in a large 
field of forces. These forces include general normative concepts 
of equality, utility, property, and charity, and the realities of 
political and economic power.19 
Hazard's assertion leads to the inevitable conclusion that "lawyers 
necessarily are to some degree political actors," and that "[a] posi­
17. MODEL CODE EC 2-26. 
18. MODEL RULES Rule 6.2 emt. 1. 
19. HAZARD, supra note 10, at 89. 
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tion adopted by a lawyer on behalf of a client thus influences, even 
if in a small way, the configuration of the law itself."20 
Despite efforts to mollify an attorney's discomfort with the 
prospect of certain types of representation vis-a-vis rules which con­
done, and even praise such representation, no rule can cure the psy­
chological and ethical conflicts that will sometimes arise. This 
discomfort· is further compounded by the fundamental nature of 
legal advocacy. For in order to prepare a case, it is essential that an 
attorney embrace a set of facts and structure and present a persua­
sive and oftentimes passionate argument. While the rules en­
courage attorneys to accept unpopular cases without fear of reprisal 
to reputation?! it is easy to do so when one is indifferent to the 
cause. Furthermore, to require an attorney to represent a client 
whose cause she finds repugnant is to forcibly intrude into one's 
private belief system. Most of the time, an attorney's decision to 
decline to represent an undesirable client or cause is a permissible 
exercise of professional autonomy under the rules. There are times, 
however, when because of a convergence ofcause and client, such 
refusal resembles class-based discrimination which society, through 
its laws and collective conscience, finds intolerable. 
III. DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION OF CLIENTS 
A. Public Policy Against Discrimination 
The legal profession has not uniformly adopted ethical rules 
which prohibit discriminatory conduct in the practice of law.22 
However, lawyers' conduct is subject to regulation by a host of con­
stitutional and legislative dictates. To date, there has been no uni­
versal application of antidiscrimination prinCiples to the client 
selection decision. 
In recognizing the need to eliminate class-based discrimination, 
federal and state legislatures have enacted numerous laws in an ef­
fort to fulfill the goals of equality. Federal legislation prohibiting 
20. Id. at 90. With this viewpoint in mind, the client selection decision may trig­
ger First Amendment issues. In her essay, Leora Harpaz analyzes the free speech im­
plications of an attorney's representation of a client and discusses how Nathanson's 
advocacy of Stropnicky's cause qualifies as constitutionally protected free speech. See, 
e.g., Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights of 
Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998). 
21. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b) C'A lawyer'S representation of a client, includ­
ing representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's 
political, economic, social or moral views or activities."). . 
22. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination in employment, housing, and education serve to 
eradicate invidious discrimination in areas central to a free, civil 
society, to protect individual liberties, to provide a remedy for vic­
tims of discrimination and to deter discrimination.23 In the past 
three decades, Congress has added age24 and disability25 to the pre­
viously protected groups (i.e., race, sex, and national origin) as spe­
cial classes subject to protection by antidiscrimination laws. 
Complementing federal legislation, several states have passed pub­
lic accommodation laws and human rights laws which prohibit nu­
merous forms of public acts of discrimination.26 
Antidiscrimination legislation historically has targeted discrim­
ination by public institutions and only recently has targeted private 
acts of discrimination.27 More recently, legislation has been en­
acted with the goal of reaching a wider range of institutions and 
individuals, and protecting a larger group of people from being vic­
timized by discrimination.28 Traditionally, professional offices did 
not fall within the reach of public accommodation laws.29 However, 
many state public accommodation laws have been applied to 
medical and dental offices. Prior to Stropnicky, state public accom­
modation laws did not enumerate and were not construed to in­
clude lawyers' offices in the definition of a place of public 
accommodation.30 
23. For examples of federal antidiscrimination provisions, see Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994); Fair Housing Act, 42 u.s.c. 
§§ 3601-3631 (1994); Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1710, 
1712-1721,1751-1758 (1994). 
24. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994). 
25. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
26. See generally DONALD H. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGlN, LEGAL As­
PEers OF AIDS app. 2A (1991) (providing a compilation of state statutes relating to 
public accommodation). 
27. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that federal law which 
prohibits race discrimination in private contracting is applicable to a private, commer­
cially operated, nonsectarian school); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (re­
viewing the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws). 
28. Efforts by AIDS activists have resulted in the creation of state and local 
human rights commissions which enforce public accommodation laws, and broadened 
the definition of place of public accommodation to reach professional offices of doctors 
and dentists. See supra note 6. 
29. But cf 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F) (including lawyers' offices within the defini­
tion of place of public accommodation; only federal civil rights legislation to enumerate 
lawyers' offices in definition of public accommodation). To date, this has not been ap­
plied to client selection decisions. 
30. As lawyers' offices have never been likened to common carriers or public 
utilities, there has not been a duty on the part of lawyers to open their offices to every­
one or to serve all. See Begg, supra note 6, at 300-01. 
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B. Professions Regulating Themselves 
Concomitant with society's over arching concerns with both 
public and private discrimination, many professional organizations 
have enacted professional rules which prohibit discriminatory prac­
tices. In some instances, these rules reach the selection of clients. 
Engineers, dentists, social workers, and physicians, for example, 
have adopted ethical codes which unequivocally prohibit these pro­
fessionals from refusing to provide services based on invidious 
discrimination.31 
In contrast, the legal profession32 largely has refrained from 
applying antidiscrimination principles to the client selection pro­
cess. As set forth above, the professional responsibility rules gov­
erning lawyers afford wide discretion in the decision whether to 
accept a client or a cause. Refusal to represent a client may be 
based on an inability to pay a fee, a dislike of the person, or out­
right discrimination.33 Such unfettered discretion permits invidious 
discrimination by the very persons who have taken an oath to up­
hold the Constitution34 and eradicate such discrimination. Client 
selection decision motivated by discriminatory animus harms the in­
dividuals involved, the profession, and the institution of justice. 
Some state bar associations have taken the initiative to adopt 
antidiscrimination rules relating to lawyers' conduct. These rules, 
however, may only pertain to employment discrimination35 or con­
duct in connection with the practice of law.36 Whether these rules 
31. See id. at 297-99 and accompanying notes. 
32. California rules make discrinlination in the selection and temlination of cli­
ents a violation of the ethical rules. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
33. See WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 573. 
34. The oath lawyers take upon admission to the practice of law includes a pledge 
to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to devote oneself to public service, 
and to the public good. 
35. See, e.g., DISTRICf OF COLUMBIA RYLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule 
9.1 (1997) ("A lawyer shall not discrinlinate against any individual in conditions of em­
ployment because of the individual's race, color, ... sex ...."); VERMONT CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1996-97) ("A lawyer shall not ... 
[d]iscrinlinate against any individual ... in hiring, promoting or otherwise detemlining 
the conditions of employment of that individual."). 
36. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONOUCf Rule 1.2(f) (1997) 
("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that exhibits or is in­
tended to appeal to or engender bias against a person ... whether that conduct is 
directed to other counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties, judges, judicial officers, or 
any persons involved in the legal process."); RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR 
Rule 4-8.4(d) ("A lawyer shall not engage ... in conduct in connection with the practice 
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or 
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, ju­
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cover the client selection decision is debatable.37 Standing alone, 
the California Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly prohibit 
"unlawful discrimination . . . on the basis of race, national origin, 
sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability ... in accepting or 
terminating representation of any client."38 Professionalism look­
ing outward challenges the legal profession to reconcile the fact 
that, unlike other professions, its members, though sworn to uphold 
the rule of law, are not required to apply antidiscrimination princi­
ples to the selection of clients. 
IV. BALANCING COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS 
A lawyer's rejection of a client based solely on gender is dis­
crimination and should not be countenanced. In contrast, a law­
yer's refusal to represent an anarchist based on the lawyer's 
patriotism is sanctioned by both the professional rules and society 
at large. Since the refusal is based on an ideological clash, no class­
based discrimination is perceived. But what happens, when for ex­
ample, this same ideology which drives the client selection decision 
is indelibly linked with that of a protected class? Should the policy 
underlying antidiscrimination legislation give way to the lawyer's 
right to autonomy in the client selection decision? Or should an­
tidiscrimination considerations trump lawyer autonomy? This is 
the conundrum present in Stropnicky. Is it possible to simultane­
ously respect antidiscrimination principles and the lawyer's auton­
omy in the client selection process? A second look at Stropnicky, 
with an eye to both Ms. Nathanson's public role as a lawyer and her 
personal interest in lawyer autonomy, coupled with consideration 
of the factors motivating her decision, suggests that the' answer is 
yes. 
A. Looking OutWard: Gender Discrimination 
On the surface, Ms. Nathanson's decision to reject Mr. 
Stropnicky because he is a man disserves the public interest in 
open, free and fair access to the system of justice, and can serve to 
disparage the profession for condoning a lawyer's right to pick and 
rors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not lim­
ited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender ...."); NEW YORK CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(6) ("A lawyer [or law firm] shall not ... 
unlawfully discriminate in the practice of law, including in hiring, prom~ting, or other­
wise determining conditions of employment, on the basis of age ...."). 
37. See Begg, supra note 6, at 318-23. 
38. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 2-400(B)(2) (1997). 
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choose her client even if it runs afoul of antidiscrimination princi­
ples. Furthermore, discrimination undeniably affects the individual 
and, in this case, caused Mr. Stropnicky distress over being rejected 
based on an immutable characteristic.39 It is to these interests that 
laws and rules which seek to curb attorney discretion are directed. 
Absent a countervailing concern justifying such conduct in the cli­
ent selection process, Ms. Nathanson's decision would be improper 
and could constitute unlawful discrimination.40 
B. Looking Inward: Lawyer Autonomy 
The specter of unlawful discrimination is not apparent from the 
perspective of Ms. Nathanson who declined to represent Mr. 
Stropnicky not because he is a man, but because her professional 
raison d'etre is to support women in the family law courts and to 
remedy past and present discrimination of women in the family law 
arena.41 Were Ms. Nathanson required to represent Mr. Stropnicky 
and thereby to advocate a position and present herself in a manner 
inconsistent with her own self-concept as a person and attorney, she 
could surely compromise her professional and personal integrity. 
In an environment such as the family law courts, where systemic 
gender biases have been officially recognized,42 Ms. Nathanson's 
zealous representation of Mr. Stropnicky could well entail a reli­
ance, and even a deliberate utilization of such biases. Coerced rep­
resentation of Mr. Stropnicky would place Ms. Nathanson's 
personal beliefs in conflict with the requirements of zealous advo­
cacy. In circumstances such as this, a lawyer should have the "ethi­
cal discretion" to refuse a client that is based not on "a personal 
privilege of arbitrary decision, but [based on] a professional duty of 
reflective judgment. "43 
39. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MCAD 
Feb. 25, 1997). 
40. The decision in Stropnicky did not consider the public accommodation law's 
potential constitutional deficiencies as applied. To the extent such legislation is found 
to be unconstitutional, a lawyer's rejection of a client, though unconscionable, may be 
lawful. 
41. Professor Chin's essay in this volume notes the paradox Stropnicky arouses. 
The "ironic general rule," he elaborates, will undermine the ideals driving antidis­
crimination legislation and penalize those most intent on furthering these ideals. 
Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 9, 11 (1998). 
42. See Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 745, 746-48 (1990). 
43. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 
1083 (1988). 
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C. Motivating Factors: Attorneys' Refusal to Represent 
In addition to the inner conflict a coerced representation may 
provoke,44 forcing an attorney-client relationship in a situation 
which challenges the attorney's personal belief system not only 
jeopardizes the ethical requirement of zealous advocacy, it may ig­
nore otherwise legitimate objectives. As much as Ms. Nathanson's 
rejection of Mr. Stropnicky as a client may resemble gender dis­
crimination, it is motivated not by gender animus but by a deep 
commitment to a legitimate social cause.4S 
Ms. Nathanson purposely restricted her divorce practice to his­
torical victims of discrimination with the goal of remedying gender 
discrimination against women in the area of family law and eradi­
cating gender bias in the courts. Her commitment to remedying 
past discrimination serves a legitimate, lawful objective.46 
Favorable treatment to the victims of past discrimination is a form 
of corrective justice.47 
44. When lawyers are called upon to represent clients, or causes they disdain, the 
negative feelings about the representation unwittingly may be transferred to the clients. 
See Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on George Orwell 
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1993). Dean Richard 
Matasar asks, "What to do when lawyering is at odds with one's sense of right and 
wrong?" Richard Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 71 FLA. B.J. 75, 76 (1997). 
Dean Matasar suggests that lawyers "[d]o what the profession demands .... [T]his is 
the price of being a lawyer." Id. at 77. This approach requires the lawyer to subjugate 
her personal beliefs in order to zealously represent the client or to separate her profes­
sional and personal selves. See id. This latter approach might entail justifying repre­
senting clients' interests that are at odds with personal beliefs by simultaneously 
engaging in personally-satisfying pro bono work. 
45. The relationship between such commitment and one's personal integrity is 
aptly noted by Professor Miller in his essay. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, 
Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of 
Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 93, 95 (1998). 
46. See generally Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (Pow­
ell, J.) ("To eliminate every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination ... [is a 
legitimate interest to which] race-conscious remedial action may be necessary."); Fulli­
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
47. See Margaret Jane Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 
51 (1991). 
If individuals or groups hold entitlements that positive law has failed to recog­
nize, then corrective justice requires that we change the law, and if individuals 
or groups hold entitlements that positive law has nominally recognized but not 
enforced, then corrective justice requires that we change our inaction and en­
force them. This notion does not implicate the problems currently associated 
with affirmative action. 
Id. Unlike affirmative action policies which disadvantage excluded persons, a lawyer's 
discretion to decline a client's case is unlikely to deprive the client of legal 
representation. 
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Legitimate interests such as eradicating bias against a histori­
cally discriminated group must be balanced against antidis­
criminatory principles in evaluating the client selection decision. 
When lawyers retain ethical discretion in the client selection deci­
sion, justice is served by respecting the interests of both clients and 
lawyers as participants in our system of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
In a society governed by laws, lawyers playa unique role as the 
profession armed with the tools to assist those who wish to assert a 
legal claim along with those who are forced to enter the legal arena 
to defend an action. While in the days of the American colonies, 
lawyers "for hire" were not permitted to ply their trade, and legal 
causes were presented and resolved in a lay environment, the com­
plexities of the developing society transformed this scenario into 
one where America now claims in excess of 70% of the world's 
lawyers.48 As lawyers became a fixture upon the American scene, 
efforts to regulate and guide the profession developed. 
The code of ethics or professional responsibility which all law­
yers are sworn to obey does not insulate the lawyer from a host of 
conflicting duties and responsibilities affecting the service of clients, 
the administration of justice, and the moral obligations to oneself. 
The ethical rules admonish a lawyer not to decline representation 
because a client or cause is unpopular and require a lawyer to rep­
resent her client zealously and competently. In addition, a lawyer 
enters a fiduciary relationship with her client promising a duty of 
loyalty and confidentiality to the client. 
Coexisting with professionalism considerations of lawyers as 
public servants, the rules recognize that lawyers as advocates must 
be accorded the discretion to reject causes or clients that are repug­
nant to their personal views. This feature of the rules recognizes 
that lawyers who must zealously represent causes that are repug­
nant to their personal views cannot always reconcile the outward­
looking and inward-looking aspects of professionalism. In this re­
spect, a lawyer's professional and private sides are at war; a state in 
which the client suffers, the lawyer and profession suffer, and the 
48. The 70% figure was commonly quoted by the media after it "became a famil­
iar factoid in the rhetoric of the 1992 (presidential] campaign." Marc Galanter, News 
from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77, 77-78 
(1993) (contending that the 70% figure is overstated; that comparing numbers of law­
yers in various countries is an "apples and oranges" problem). 
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administration of justice suffers. Such discretion in the client selec­
tion decision should not extend as far as permiting an attorney to 
engage in class-based discrimination notwithstanding personal ani­
mus toward the group to which a potential client belongs. Despite 
this, a lawyer must retain ethical discretion when selecting clients 
that allows a balancing of interests when discriminatory considera­
tions are pitted against the lawyer's personal and professional integ­
rity. Lawyers must have the freedom to follow their conscience 
when discriminatory concerns are offset by legitimate, lawful inter­
ests. Only then will a lawyer be ready to say to oneself and the 
public that "what we have become" are professionals serving the 
public good while adhering to the highest standards of professional­
ism, outwardly and inwardly. 
